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SIGNALER CREDIBILITY, SIGNAL SUSCEPTIBILITY, AND
RELATIVE RELIANCE ON SIGNALS: HOW STAKEHOLDERS
CHANGE THEIR EVALUATIVE PROCESSES
AFTER VIOLATION OF EXPECTATIONS
AND REHABILITATIVE EFFORTS
DAVID GOMULYA
Nanyang Technological University
YURI MISHINA
Imperial College London
Prior studies have shown that a firm’s violation of expectations might lead to less fa-
vorable evaluations of that firm by stakeholders. However, the literature has been silent
on whether and how the process by which stakeholders evaluate a firm could change
subsequent to the violation. Drawing from signaling and screening theory, we examine
how evaluative processes might change in the context of financial restatements. We find
that investors appear to shift their relative reliance on particular signals in determining
a firm’s stock price following an earnings restatement. These changes are at least partly
reversed following the replacement of an incumbent CEO. We further find that these
evaluative changes vary depending on the severity of the violation.
Should stakeholders continue to rely on what
a firm says after it has violated their expectations?
For example, if an automobile firm is found to have
lied about its emissions standards or an energy firm
manipulates its earnings, should stakeholders ever
have faith in the firm again? If so, under what con-
ditions? The recent spate of scandals and mis-
conduct prompts questions such as these and has
reignited scholarly interest in how violating the ex-
pectations of stakeholders can impact firms (Devers,
Dewett,Mishina, &Belsito, 2009;Gomulya&Boeker,
2014, 2015; Karpoff, Lee, & Martin, 2008a; Pfarrer,
Decelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008; Rhee & Haunschild,
2006; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012).
These studies have found that violating stakeholder
expectations can lead to a host of undesirable con-
sequences for the firm, such as lower accounting
performance (Baucus & Baucus, 1997), negative fi-
nancial market reactions (Davidson &Worrell, 1988,
1992; Karpoff et al., 2008a; Karpoff & Lott, 1993;
Karpoff, Lott, &Wehrly, 2005), reducedmarket share
(Rhee & Haunschild, 2006), and a damaged firm
evaluation (e.g., Devers et al., 2009; Pfarrer et al.,
2008; Zavyalova et al., 2012).1 While these studies
have provided some insights about the conse-
quences of violating expectations, there are at least
two main reasons for scholars to delve more deeply
into this issue.
First, although prior literature has found that vio-
lating expectations can damage evaluations (e.g.,
Rhee&Haunschild, 2006; Zavyalova et al., 2012), the
literature has been relatively silent on how the in-
teractions between such firms and their stakeholders
may change afterward (cf., Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger,
& Hubbard, 2016). A number of studies have found
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1 Weuse “firm evaluations” as an umbrella term tomean
the judgments that stakeholders make about a particular
firm regarding a specific dimension of interest. Reputa-
tions, status, celebrity, and legitimacy are some of the firm
evaluations that have been explored in the organizational
literature (for reviews see, e.g., Devers et al., 2009). In the
empirical context of this study, we particularly focus on
how firm stock price reflects how shareholders evaluate
a firm.
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that stakeholders may exit relationships with firms
that violate their expectations (e.g., Jensen, 2006;
Sutton & Callahan, 1987) or otherwise lower their
level of organizational support (Zavyalova et al.,
2016). However, an alternative possibility is that
a stakeholder might not disengage entirely, but in-
stead alter the process by which they evaluate the
firm (e.g., Mishina, Block, & Mannor, 2012). Indeed,
the signaling and related screening literature has
suggested that the relative weight that the receivers
give to particular signals can change based on the
nature of the signaler, signal, and other factors
(e.g., Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011). Be-
cause violating expectations calls into question the
credibility of the focal firm (Karpoff, Lee, & Martin,
2008b; Zhang & Wiersema, 2009), signaling and
screening arguments would then imply that stake-
holders may not only change their evaluation of
a focal firm but could also potentially change their
evaluative process—that is, change which signals
they attend to or ignore, as well as the relative em-
phasis they give to certain signals. Unfortunately,we
have very little understanding of whether and how
violating expectations can alter not only the favor-
ability of stakeholders’ evaluation of a given firm, but
also the working mechanisms of stakeholders’ cal-
culus in evaluating a firm following the violation.
Relatedly, because a violation of expectations by
a firm tends to reduce its credibility (Karpoff et al.,
2008b), the signals produced by such firms are likely
to be viewed with greater suspicion (Zhang &
Wiersema, 2009). At the same time, some signals
are likely to be more difficult to falsify, manipulate,
or otherwise fake (Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 2005;
Gomulya & Boeker, 2014; Sanders & Boivie, 2004),
and thus a firm’s credibility is not likely to have
uniform effects on all signals it generates—the per-
ceived trustworthiness (and thususefulness) of some
signals are going to be more compromised than
others. Consequently, stakeholders may reconsider
their relative reliance on particular signals when
making decisions about a focal firm depending on
whether they view the firm as being credible. How-
ever, the manner in which stakeholders will do so is
still an open question.
To deepen our understanding on this matter, we
explore whether and how stakeholders may change
their evaluative processes of a firm based on two
critical events that can alter perceptions about the
focal firm’s credibility—violation of expectations
and the rehabilitative efforts that follow.Weexamine
this question in the context of firms that have vio-
lated expectations in a particular way; that is, had
earnings restatements. We use signaling and screen-
ing theories (e.g., Connelly et al., 2011; Sanders &
Boivie, 2004) to develop hypotheses about how one
type of stakeholder—investors—alters themanner in
which they utilize signals to value the firm’s stock
price. By doing so, we primarily contribute to liter-
ature on violation of expectations and signaling and
screening theories.
First, we contribute to the literature on violation of
expectations by examining how violations can alter
the evaluative process. For example, while prior lit-
erature has focused on how violations might lead to
lower financial performance (e.g., Baucus & Baucus,
1997; Davidson & Worrell, 1988, 1992) and a dam-
aged firm evaluation (e.g., Pfarrer et al., 2008;
Zavyalova et al., 2012), our theory and results sug-
gest that violating expectations might not just alter
the favorability of a social evaluation, but also fun-
damentally change the process by which firms are
evaluated. At the same time, our results show that
stakeholders were willing to reverse their earlier
decisions and revert to their earlier evaluative pro-
cess following firms’ rehabilitative efforts. This
insight is not obvious given that an expectation vio-
lation may have broken the trust between firms and
stakeholders permanently. This indicates how
stakeholders could adopt a rather sophisticated ap-
proach to utilize quite wisely any information that
can be extracted from a signal, and change their de-
cisions if needed.
Second, we contribute to signaling and screening
theories by distinguishing between two sources of
noise during signaling—noise from the signal itself
and noise from the behavior of the signaler (Connelly
et al., 2011).We argue that violations of expectations
are likely to increase the second type of noise
(i.e., that which is attributable to the behavior of the
signaler) by calling the credibility of the signaler into
question (Karpoff et al., 2008b; Zhang & Wiersema,
2009). At the same time, however, we argue that this
is not likely to affect all signals generated by the
signaler equally because signals that are more re-
sistant to potential errors and manipulations are
likely to be less affected.2 We suggest that stake-
holders may change their reliance on different types
of signals based on the credibility of the signaler, and
thus a similar signal is likely to have different effects
for credible versus less credible firms. We next turn
to the literature on violation of expectations.
2 We thank one of our reviewers for suggesting this
characteristic.
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Firms violate stakeholder expectations when
their behaviors or outcomes do not match stake-
holders’ predictions, social norms, or both (see,
e.g., Vaughan, 1999 for a review). This could include,
for example, missing earnings targets (Pfarrer,
Pollock, & Rindova, 2010), engaging in behavior
that is viewed to be illegitimate (Devers et al., 2009),
and engaging in illegal activities (Mishina, Dykes,
Block, & Pollock, 2010). When firms violate the ex-
pectations of their stakeholders, this can result in
a variety of negative outcomes. For example, product
recalls have been found to reduce a firm’s market
share (Rhee & Haunschild, 2006), and result in neg-
ative financialmarket reactions (Davidson&Worrell,
1992) and negativemedia coverage (Zavyalova et al.,
2012); National Collegiate Athletic Association in-
fractions may result in lower donations (Zavyalova
et al., 2016); and illegal activities of various types can
reduce accounting performance and sales growth
(Baucus & Baucus, 1997), increase turnover of exec-
utives and directors (Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, &
Dalton, 2006; Gomulya & Boeker, 2015; Karpoff et al.,
2008a), and lead to loweredmarket value (Davidson&
Worrell, 1988, 1992; Karpoff et al., 2005). Broadly,
manyof these authors have suggested that at least part
of these stakeholder reactions are due to a loss of trust
and credibility (e.g., Karpoff et al., 2008b; Rhee &
Haunschild, 2006; Zavyalova et al., 2016).We suggest
that the loss of credibility for the focal firm following
a violation of expectation likely has differential im-
pacts on how stakeholders will react to signals that
the focal firm generates.
Signaling and screening theories talk about situa-
tions of information asymmetry between actors
(Connelly et al., 2011; Spence, 1973). The theories’
core idea is that some attribute of interest (e.g., firm
quality) is not directly observable by other actors ex
ante, and thus the firm needs to figure out some way
to communicate to its audience that it has this attri-
bute by sending particular signals. In general, effec-
tive signals are those that are observable by the
receivers of interest and are costly for those without
the underlying characteristic to send (Connelly et al.,
2011; Spence, 1973). At the organizational level, a lot
of this work has examined how firms try to commu-
nicate their investment-worthiness to the equity
market during an initial public offering (IPO) be-
cause potential investors may have very little in-
formation with which to determine the appropriate
value of such firms. This research has found, for ex-
ample, that firms undergoing an IPO may be able to
indicate that they are of high investment quality
through signals such as the backgrounds of their
executives (Cohen & Dean, 2005; Higgins & Gulati,
2006), incentive and board structures (Certo, 2003;
Certo,Daily, &Dalton, 2001; Sanders&Boivie, 2004),
the reputation of their underwriters (Carter, Dark, &
Singh, 1998; Carter & Manaster, 1990), and the
prominence of their alliance partners (Gulati &
Higgins, 2003; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999), be-
cause lower-quality firms would find it more diffi-
cult to send such signals (e.g., due to the difficulty in
attracting top executives or alliance partners).
Screening theory is the counterpart to signaling
theory, where the focus shifts from how senders de-
termine which signals to send, to how the receiver
prioritizes among possible types of signals. Hence,
the difference is that in signalingmodels, the focus is
on how senders select which signals to send, and in
screeningmodels the focus is on how receivers place
differential value on signals that the senders might
send (Connelly et al., 2011; Sanders & Boivie, 2004).
Just as signaling theory argues that effective signals
are those that would be costly (Connelly et al., 2011;
Spence, 1973), screening theory similarly posits that
receivers screen by focusing on signals that they be-
lieve are highly correlated with unobservable char-
acteristics of interest (Sanders & Boivie, 2004;Weiss,
1995; Zhang & Wiersema, 2009). Hence, both theo-
ries are essentially concerned with the amount of
noise (i.e., the part of the signal that is not informative
about theunderlying characteristic of interest) inherent
in a signal and try to send or select signals that likely
contain a lower proportion of noise, since noisier sig-
nals more likely lead to decision errors (e.g., Stiglitz,
2000).
In this regard, Connelly and colleagues (2011)
identified two different sources of noise—noise from
the signal itself and noise from the behavior of the
signaler. The first type of noise arises because a sig-
nal may not perfectly capture and reflect the un-
observable characteristics that screeners may be
interested in. (e.g., Busenitz et al., 2005; Zhang &
Wiersema, 2009). For example, patents may be good
proxies for the underlying quality of a firm’s research
and development capabilities and scientific exper-
tise (Stuart et al., 1999), since firms without strong
research capabilities would not be able to obtain
them quite as easily. However, given the complexity
behind innovation and patenting processes, patents
may not perfectly capture and reflect the true re-
search and development capabilities of a firm.
The second type of noise is due to the behavior of
the signaler—that is,whether the signaler is behaving
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in a way that could, intentionally or unintentionally,
compromise the credibility of a signal (e.g., Arthurs,
Busenitz,Hoskisson, & Johnson, 2009;Busenitz et al.,
2005). Using the previous example, a firm could also
miscount or intentionally misrepresent the number
of patents it possesses, in which case, despite the
normallyhighcorrelationbetweenactualpatents and
the innovative capabilities of a firm, the self-reported
number of patents by the firm would contain more
noise and thus be less informative about the firm’s
true research capabilities.
If the behavior of a signaler violates certain expec-
tations (e.g., Karpoff et al., 2008b; Rhee&Haunschild,
2006; Zavyalova et al., 2016), then the signaler’s
credibility will tend to decrease. This is because vi-
olations of expectations occur when a firm is either
unwilling or unable to fulfill its expectations. In the
former case, this would suggest that the firm’s value
system may not be congruent with those of its stake-
holders (e.g.,Devers et al., 2009). In the latter, itwould
suggest that the firm is: (a) unaware of what those
expectations are, (b) does not have the resources or
capabilities to fulfill expectations, or (c) both. Re-
gardless of whether the violation of expectations was
due to unwillingness or inability, it should create
uncertainty in the minds of stakeholders regarding
the firm’s capabilities, value system, or both (e.g.,
Mishinaet al., 2012).Hence, the futurebehaviorof the
firm becomes less predictable to stakeholders, and
concerns pertaining to the second type of noise will
increase. However, the noise associated with the
signaler is not likely to affect all signals generated by
that signaler equally. In particular, this is due to the
fact that signals may be differentially susceptible to
potential errors and manipulations. This could be
due to a variety of possible reasons, including
whether the signal is self- or other-reported, whether
it is verifiable, or whether it is a “stock” or a “flow”
signal (e.g., Dierickx & Cool, 1989).
Self-reported signals should on average be more
susceptible to manipulations by the focal signaler
(i.e., the one who can benefit from a positive signal)
compared to signals reported by third parties. This is
why, for example, self-made claims about educa-
tional background, test scores, and related accom-
plishments that depend on the credibility of the focal
signaler may be perceived as more susceptible to
manipulations compared to copies of degrees and
transcripts sent by the educational institutions di-
rectly, or letters of recommendation sent from the
recommenders. Similarly, signals may be more re-
sistant to errors or manipulations due to their veri-
fiability. For example, a firm’s history of awards and
patents can be verified by checking with the appro-
priate awarding bodies and patent offices (e.g.,
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office), while an orga-
nization’s self-professed capabilities may be less
verifiable to anyone not part of the organization.
Finally, somesignals canbe consideredas “stocks”
while others would be “flows.” A “stock” indicates
the level or value of a certain object of interest at
a givenpoint in timewhile a“flow” indicateschanges
to that level over a period of time (e.g., Dierickx &
Cool, 1989). For example, the total patents currently
possessed by a firm would be a stock signal that may
indicate the firm’s cumulative research capability,
but the number of new patents generated in the pre-
vious year would be considered a flow signal that
may indicate how the firm’s research capabilities
have changed in the last year. Dierickx and Cool
(1989: 1506) also noted, “while flows can be adjusted
instantaneously, stocks cannot.” This may make au-
diences less likely to find it unusual if flow signals
change from year to year, and thereby make flow
signals easier to manipulate and hence more sus-
ceptible to potential manipulations. On the other
hand, not only are changes to stock signals more no-
ticeable, but even if there was an error or intentional
manipulation, the cumulative nature of a stock signal
will make the impact of a disturbance upon it pro-
portionately smaller than itwouldbeona flowsignal.
For example, let us suppose that a firm reports
having 500 patents to date (an indication of the stock
of patents to date, or a stock signal) and produces on
average 50 new patents per year (an indication of the
flowor rate of patents producedover aperiodof time,
or a flow signal), where the higher number of patent
stock relative to the rate of patents produced per year
is because the former reflects accumulation over
time whereas the latter only reveals an average over
a period of time and thus is not cumulative. In the
event that the firm declares that it actually only
produced 25 instead of 50 patents in the previous
year, the impact of this patent restatement should be
more minimal on the overall level of patents to date
(i.e., in this example, only a change of 25 patents out
of 500, or a 5% change) than on the rate of patents
produced a year (i.e., in this example, a change of 25
patents out of 50, or a 50%change).Accordingly, and
asmentioned above, the cumulative nature of a stock
signal will make the impact of a disturbance upon it
proportionately smaller than it would be on a flow
signal—that is, 5% instead of 50%, respectively, in
this example.
Regardless of the specific reason, we therefore
argue that the noise generated by the behavior of the
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signaler would have less of an effect on signals that
are less prone to errors or manipulations. Conse-
quently, a signal that is perhaps a better proxy of the
unobservable characteristics of a signaler but ismore
susceptible tomistakes or falsificationmay appear to
be less reliable than a signal that is perhaps a weaker
proxy but is more difficult to falsify if the signaler’s
credibility is called into question. Because reliance
on noisy signals is more likely to lead to decision
errors (e.g., Stiglitz, 2000), at any given point in time,
stakeholders will rely more on signals that have less
overall noise and rely less on signals that have more
overall noise. Thus, we suggest that stakeholders
may accordingly change their reliance on different
types of signals based on the credibility of the sig-
naler and the nature of the signal, such that the same
signal is likely to have different effects for credible
versus less credible firms.
More specifically, if a firm has violated stake-
holder expectations, itwill lose credibility in the face
of its stakeholders (e.g., Karpoff et al., 2008b; Rhee &
Haunschild, 2006; Zavyalova et al., 2016) by in-
creasing uncertainty about its value system or capa-
bilities (e.g., Mishina et al., 2012). The reduction
in signaler credibility would have a greater effect
on signals that are more susceptible to errors or
manipulations because stakeholders may become
concerned about whether the firm may cheat or
otherwise engage in deceptive behavior in sub-
sequent interactions (Karpoff et al., 2008b; Zhang &
Wiersema, 2009). As the credibility of the signaler
decreases, stakeholders are likely to shift their re-
liance from signals that are ordinarily stronger
proxies but more susceptible to errors or manipula-
tions, to signals that are ordinarily weaker proxies
but are less susceptible. This will cause stakeholders
to decrease their relative reliance on the former sig-
nals and increase their relative reliance on the latter.
Hypothesis 1. Following a violation of expecta-
tions, stakeholders will decrease their relative
reliance on signals that are ordinarily stronger
proxies but more susceptible to errors and
manipulations.
Hypothesis 2. Following a violation of expecta-
tions, stakeholders will increase their relative
reliance on signals that are ordinarily weaker
proxies but less susceptible to errors and
manipulations.
Although violation of expectations is always likely
to be viewed in a negative light by stakeholders
because it calls into question the firm’s credibility
(Karpoff et al., 2008b; Zhang & Wiersema, 2009), we
suggest that the severity of the violation is likely to
modify the nature of stakeholders’ reactions. Since
violations of expectations occur because firms are
unaware of, unwilling to fulfill, or unable to fulfill
the expectations, then the more severe the violation,
themore uncertain stakeholders are to become about
exactly what the firm can or will do in the future.
Thus, severe violations make the behavior or intent
of the signaler (e.g., Mishina et al., 2012) much more
unpredictable, thereby increasing stakeholder ap-
prehension and further lowering the credibility of
the signaler. Additionally, the severity of a violation
is likely to make the violation more salient in the
minds of stakeholders and thus to dominate their
judgments (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Be-
cause it does greater damage to the credibility of the
signaler, we expect a more severe violation to in-
crease the noisiness of signals that are more suscep-
tible to errors and manipulation. Consequently, we
expect that stakeholderswill further shift the relative
reliance on signals posited in Hypotheses 1 and 2,
such that stakeholders further increase their rela-
tive reliance on signals that may ordinarily be
weaker proxies but are less susceptible to errors
and manipulations, and further decrease their rel-
ative reliance on signals that are ordinarily stronger
proxies but more susceptible to errors and
manipulation.
Hypothesis 3. Following amore severe violation
of expectations, stakeholders will decrease their
relative reliance to a greater degree on signals
that are ordinarily stronger proxies but more
susceptible to errors and manipulations.
Hypothesis 4. Following amore severe violation
of expectations, stakeholders will increase their
relative reliance to a greater degree on signals
that are ordinarily weaker proxies but less sus-
ceptible to errors and manipulations.
Effect of Rehabilitative Efforts
Following a violation of expectations, a firm is
likely to face additional scrutiny and pressures from
its stakeholders to make changes to avoid further vi-
olations in the future (e.g., Chandler, 2014). One way
inwhich firmsmay attempt to reduce these pressures
would be to engage in impression-management
activities—that is, activities that are geared toward
shaping or influencing the perceptions of the audi-
ence, generally in reaction to a threat or antici-
pated threat to the organization (e.g., Elsbach, 1994;
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Elsbach, Sutton, & Principe, 1998). To this end, the
organizational-level impression management litera-
ture has examined how firms may use performance
attributions (e.g., Bettman &Weitz, 1983; Salancik &
Meindl, 1984; Staw, McKechnie, & Puffer, 1983),
various types of accounts and justifications (e.g.,
Elsbach, 1994; Elsbach et al., 1998;Zajac&Westphal,
1995), intentional obfuscation through release of
confounding information (Graffin, Carpenter, &
Boivie, 2011), and symbolic compliance with insti-
tutional requests (Westphal & Zajac, 1994) as at-
tempts to favorablymold stakeholder interpretations
and reactions. This literature has suggested that im-
pression management tactics are successful when
the actions or practices conform to legitimated
practices, structures, and interpretations (Elsbach,
1994), thereby highlighting the importance of the
symbolic aspects of an action in garnering legitimacy
for an organization (Suchman, 1995) and thereby
ensuring more favorable stakeholder reactions.3
While both symbolic and substantive actions can
be used to shape stakeholder interpretations and re-
actions, we believe that an action that is both sym-
bolic and substantive is likely to be more effective in
the case of violation of expectations. Chandler (2014)
recently examined firms that faced broad pressures
toward greater ethical behavior and found that firms
that received extensive media coverage of their eth-
ical transgressions tended to more substantively
adopt ethics and compliance officer positions com-
pared to firms who did not engage in ethical trans-
gressions (or who did not get caught). This suggests
that when firms have publicly violated expectations,
they may feel a greater need to engage in a more
substantive rehabilitative action to regain credibil-
ity. Indeed, the literature on rehabilitative actions
has stated that an ideal type of rehabilitative action
should not only be observable both externally and
internally and be symbolically important (Meyer &
Rowan, 1977), but should also be substantive in or-
der to allay any concerns that it is purely ceremonial
and thus decoupled from actual internal changes
(Pfarrer et al., 2008; Westphal & Zajac, 2001;
Zavyalova et al., 2012).
The replacement of an incumbent CEO following
a violation of expectations serves as such a potent
and consistent rehabilitative action for three reasons.
First, being the leader of the firm, a CEO is often held
responsible for the actions of the organization
(Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009), as dem-
onstrated by a substantial body of research that has
labeled this phenomenon “the romance of leader-
ship” (Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985). Accord-
ingly, replacing an incumbent CEO sends a clear
signal that a firm is committed to rehabilitating its
relationship with its stakeholders and pursuing
a new direction, starting at the top.
Second, the replacement of an incumbent CEO is
a straightforward action that can be observed both
internally and externally (Gangloff, Connelly, &
Shook, 2014; Gomulya & Boeker, 2014, 2015), and
thus shows a very high level of consistency inside
and outside the firm (Pfarrer et al., 2008). Such
a significant change at the top reduces uncertainty
among observers that a firm might take a purely
ceremonial action and thereby cater to impression
management without intending to substantively
address challenges within the organization (e.g.,
Zavyalova et al., 2012).
Finally, replacing the incumbent CEO is likely to
be viewed as an action that unrehabilitated firms
would find difficult to mimic, thereby making it
a credible rehabilitative action (e.g., Connelly et al.,
2011; Spence, 1973). A new CEO puts his or her own
reputational capital at stake as collateral by agreeing
to join a compromised firm (e.g., Fama, 1980;Weigelt
& Camerer, 1988), and hence he or she (and by ex-
tension the firm) has a lot to lose if the firm engages in
any further violations. By comparison, an incumbent
CEO’s reputational capitalwouldhave likely already
been compromised due to the violation, and thus he
or she would have far less to lose even if the firm
continued to engage in further activities that violate
expectations. Consequently, a firm will only be able
to take this action if: (a) it has been able to convince
the new CEO that he or she is not needlessly throw-
ing away his or her reputational capital, (b) it is
willing to generously compensate the new CEO for
the risk to his or her reputational capital, or (c) both.
If a rehabilitative effort is deemed credible enough
to remove the concerns caused by the violation of
expectations, we should observe a reversal in stake-
holders’ evaluation back to their initial preferences.
While the explanations behind stakeholders’ pref-
erences for a given signal could be numerous, it is
reasonable to expect that profit-maximizing stake-
holders would rely more on signals that are stronger
proxies of underlying firm performance, provided
that such signals are reasonably free from errors and
manipulations. As such, if a compromised firm un-
dertakes an action that unrehabilitated firms find
3 While impressionmanagement activities canbepurely
symbolic or both symbolic and substantive, the literature
has focused more on the importance of symbolic aspects
(e.g., Graffin et al., 2011).
2017 559Gomulya and Mishina
difficult to copy, this should remove concerns about
noise attributable to the credibility of the compro-
mised firm, and we would expect to see some re-
versal of the earlier hypotheses.
Specifically, we expect CEO replacements to be
a rehabilitative action that is costly to copy, and thus
to at least partially restore the credibility of a firm as
a signaler, thereby reducing the proportion of noise
attributed to signaler credibility. Although this re-
versalmight not be sufficient to completely offset the
earlier negative effect of the violation of expecta-
tions, to the extent that stakeholders find the re-
habilitative efforts by the firm credible, the
proportion of signal noise based on the lack of sig-
naler credibility should decrease. Consequently, we
hypothesize that stakeholders may shift their rela-
tive reliance closer to what it was prior to the viola-
tion by not having to rely as much on signals that are
less susceptible to errors and manipulations and by
increasingly relying again on signals that are theo-
retically more susceptible but practically have be-
come more credible again due to the rehabilitative
efforts. Effectively,
Hypothesis 5. Following rehabilitative efforts,
stakeholders will increase their relative reli-
ance on signals that are ordinarily stronger
proxies but more susceptible to errors and
manipulations.
Hypothesis 6. Following rehabilitative efforts,
stakeholderswilldecrease their relative reliance
on signals that are ordinarilyweaker proxies but
less susceptible to errors and manipulations.
Even though we argued above that replacing the
incumbent CEO with a new one might be a way for
a firm to begin rehabilitating itself following a viola-
tion of expectations, there is also reason to believe
that the rehabilitative impacts will differ depending
on the severity of the violation. We argued that
a more severe violation is likely to make the credi-
bility of the signaling firm more salient because se-
vere violations are likely to dominate the judgments
of stakeholders (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974),
perhaps be viewed as intentional (e.g.,Mishina et al.,
2012), and thus more completely damage the credi-
bility of the firm (Karpoff et al., 2008b). In this case,
any subsequent rehabilitative efforts likely generate
a stronger reaction from stakeholders when the vio-
lation such efforts aim to address is more severe and
thus easier to recall in the first place. Put differently,
stakeholders are less likely to react to rehabilitative
efforts if they cannot recall the reason behind such
efforts or appreciate their importance. More impor-
tantly, if a severe violation damages the credibility of
the signaler to a greater extent, the proportion of
noise attributable to the behavior of the signaler is
a larger proportion of the overall noise for a given
signal. Hence, rehabilitative efforts that repair the
credibility of the signaler should have a greater
impact when violations are more severe, and stake-
holders’ reactions we expect to observe in Hypoth-
eses 5 and 6 should be stronger. That is,
Hypothesis 7. Following rehabilitative efforts
after a more severe violation of expectations,
stakeholders will increase their relative reliance
to a greater degree on signals that are ordinarily
stronger proxies but more susceptible to errors
and manipulations.
Hypothesis 8. Following rehabilitative efforts
after a more severe violation of expectations,
stakeholderswilldecrease their relative reliance
to a greater degree on signals that are ordinarily
weaker proxies but less susceptible to errors and
manipulations.
METHOD
Research Setting
Given that thepurposeof this study is to investigate
the effect of violation of expectations and firms’
rehabilitative efforts on stakeholders’ evaluation of
a given firm, we focus on the context of financial
earnings misrepresentations. Financial misrepre-
sentation is identified when firms are subsequently
required to restate their financial position, thereby
acknowledging their earlier misreporting (Flanagan,
Muse, & O’Shaughnessy, 2008; GAO, 2002, 2006).
Financial misrepresentation is a particularly impor-
tant and egregious transgression since it violates one
of the core assumptions of market functioning. Fi-
nancial information is viewed as sacrosanct, and
misrepresentationof the financial positionof the firm
both fractures shared societal norms that hold de-
ception as unacceptable (Tetlock, 2002), and un-
dermines the trust of the public and investors
(Karpoff et al., 2008b), particularly because the firm
and its managers are perceived by stakeholders as
having substantial control over—and a considerable
role in—the financial misrepresentation (Devers
et al., 2009). Such a violation can damage the evalu-
ation of the firm and lead to the stigmatization and
firing of firm managers (e.g., Devers et al., 2009;
Gomulya & Boeker, 2015; Karpoff et al., 2008b).
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Data
Following past literature (Arthaud-Day et al.,
2006; Harris & Bromiley, 2007; Hennes, Leone, &
Miller, 2008), we focused on financial restatements
that involve earnings restatement (Arthaud-Day
et al., 2006: 1120). We obtained restatement an-
nouncement data from the U.S. Government Ac-
countability Office database (GAO, 2006), which
includes restatements announced as a result of ag-
gressive accounting practices, misuse of facts
applied to financial statements, oversight or mis-
interpretation of accounting rules, fraud, or compu-
tational errors; but not as a result of normal corporate
activity, simple presentation issues, or accounting
policy changes (GAO, 2006: 53). We also excluded
non-U.S.-based firms to avoid any differences in
cultural or financial reporting requirements (Pfarrer
et al., 2008). We examined restatements from 2003,
two years after the collapse of Enron andWorldCom,
to minimize the effect of top management turnover
due to spillover effects from these events (Arthaud-
Day et al., 2006).4
Financial restatement and its severity. For the
hypotheses that test the effect of a violation without
differentiating its severity (i.e., Hypotheses 1, 2, 5,
and 6), we created a dummy variable, Restated, that
differentiates restating firms from matching firms
that have not restated. However, for the hypotheses
that further distinguish the severity of the re-
statement (Hypotheses 3, 4, 7, and 8), we further di-
vided the restating firms into those that restated their
financial earnings upward (upward restatement) or
downward (downward restatement). An upward re-
statement occurs, for example, when a firm initially
declared earnings of only $10 million but later
revised them to be $20 million. A downward re-
statement is the reverse; for example, a revision from
an earlier declaration of $20 million earnings to
$10 million. As a downward restatement decreases
stakeholders’ wealth and represents a negative
change, it entails a more severe violation and worse
outcome than an upward restatement that actually
increases stakeholders’ wealth and represents a less
negative, if not positive, change. Past studies have
also found that downward revisions in earnings
tend to damage a firm’s evaluation more than
upward revisions do (e.g., Collins,Masli, Reitenga, &
Sanchez, 2009; Kinney &McDaniel, 1989; Palmrose,
Richardson, & Scholz, 2004). We elaborate more on
these dummy variables below. Using this procedure,
we identified a set of 352 firms with negative (i.e.,
downward) earnings restatements between 2003
and 2006 inclusive and 99 firms with positive
(i.e., upward) earnings restatements for the same
period.
Endogeneity. To control for potential endoge-
neity, we employed amatched-pair sampling design
that serves as a quasi-experiment and is particularly
suitable for examining phenomena with a low base
rate of occurrence, as in the case of restatements (cf.
Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Harris & Bromiley, 2007).
Similar to other studies of restatement events
(e.g., Agrawal, Jaffe, & Karpoff, 1999; Arthaud-Day
et al., 2006; Kinney, Palmrose, & Scholz, 2004;
Richardson, Tuna, & Wu, 2002), we matched each
restating firm with a firm that did not issue any re-
statement. We identified matching firms from the
same four-digit SIC code, the same time period, and
with similar total asset size.5 To further ensure
equivalency, we tested the similarity of the two
groups in terms of asset, revenue, stockholders’ eq-
uity, net income, and return on assets (ROA). We
found no statistically significant difference between
the groups onanyof these dimensions. Therefore,we
are confident that our procedure yielded appropriate
matches. With this protocol, we managed to identify
a match for all the restating firms; i.e., 352 and 99
matches for downward and upward restating firms,
respectively.
To test our hypotheses, we also collected data for
nine years surrounding a restatement year, from five
years prior to three years after and including the re-
statement year. We elaborate more on the reasoning
4 Part of this sample overlaps with those used in two
other studies (Gomulya & Boeker, 2014, 2015), but all pa-
pers substantially differ in their intents, arguments, and
key variables. Gomulya and Boeker (2014) examined how
financial restatements affect the choice of successor CEOs,
which in turn affects external reactions. In 2015, Gomulya
and Boeker took a step back and examined how board
structure in restating firms influences their CEO re-
placement process. Neither of these studies examined the
longitudinal nature of stakeholders’ evaluation of a firm
and how it might change following an expectation viola-
tion and a rehabilitative effort. We also collected several
variables specifically for this paper. In this way, these pa-
pers collectively offer a broader and more complete un-
derstanding about expectation violation as each paper
focuses on a distinct research question and entails the use
of different key concepts.
5 Prior research has suggested that even two-digit SIC
codes already capture useful characteristics of an industry,
especially those needed to evaluate industry-level perfor-
mance (Porac et al., 1999: 115).
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behind this time window when we discuss our in-
dependent variables below. After deleting observa-
tions with missing data list-wise, our dataset has
2,972 firm-years for downward restating firms and
2,981 firm-years for their matching firms. Likewise,
we have 836 firm-years for upward restating firms
and 709 firm-years for their matching firms.6
Measures
Dependent variable. As we intend to examine
investors’ reliance on various signals in evaluating
a firm, the dependent variable is a firm’s stock price
at the end of a fiscal year. The use of a firm’s equity
market value allows us to examine the degree to
which shareholders rely on a particular signal in
valuing a firm, which is reflected as the estimated
coefficient of a given financial information covariate
in the regressionmodel (Barth, Beaver, & Landsman,
2001: 81). We calculated stock price on a per-share
basis (share-deflated) to control for scale effects
(Barth & Clinch, 2009).
Independent variables.
Signals in financial contexts. For most financial
market participants, the primary goal is information
accuracy about likely future performance of the firm
in order to take advantage of market imperfections
(e.g., Fama, 1970; Stiglitz, 2000).Hence, indicators of
the underlying, unobservable state of a firm’s finan-
cial health are bound to attract shareholders’ atten-
tion and are thus likely to be treated as important
signals whenmaking price determinations by current
and potential investors. Various studies in the ac-
counting literature that have focused on how share-
holders might value a given firm have singled out the
book value of equity and the firm’s earnings—the
“bottom line items in the balance sheet and income
statement,” respectively (Ohlson, 1995: 661)—as two
particularly important firm signals that are used by
shareholders to help evaluate a firm (Barth & Clinch,
2009; Francis & Schipper, 1999; Ohlson, 1995;
Wilson, 2008). The literature has suggested that
earnings and the book value of equity constitute some
of the “fundamentals” of a firm that give a strong
indication of its future prospects, and that together
these indicators can parsimoniously and sufficiently
determine the value of a firm (Barth & Clinch, 2009;
Francis & Schipper, 1999; Ohlson, 1995). However,
a firm’s earnings and its book value of equity differ in
termsof their proxy to performance and susceptibility
to errors and manipulations.
When firms violate expectations by engaging in an
earnings restatement, the credibility of earnings can
be more compromised than the credibility of book
value of equity because earnings is a financial in-
dicator of change over a period of time that serves as
a “flow” signal, while book value of equity is a fi-
nancial indicator of accumulationup to a givenpoint
in time that serves as a “stock” signal (in this context,
both signals are self-reported and verifiable). Indeed,
earnings for a current year onlymake up a fraction of
a firm’s book value of equity due to the cumulative
nature of the latter. As such, the effect of earnings
restatements on book value of equity is proportion-
ally less than on firm earnings itself. Additionally,
only the proportion of earnings after excluding
distributions to shareholders (i.e., dividends) in-
fluences the firm’s book value of equity, thereby
reducing even further the impact of earnings
restatement on the book value of equity. Together,
these factors suggests that any potential noise due to
errors inor falsificationof the reportingof earnings in
a givenyearwouldbeproportionally less on thebook
value of equity than on the earnings of that year. In
our dataset, the average value of a firm’s book value
of equity ($10.01 per share) is also 15.2 times that of
the earnings ($0.66 per share). Any revision in
earnings would thus have proportionally less effect
on the book value of equity.
However, the cumulative nature of book value of
equity captures not only recent performance but also
past performance. Earnings, however, only capture
recent firm performance. As such, book value of eq-
uity is less proximal than earnings in predicting firm
recent performance. Accordingly, we used earnings
per share as a measure of a signal that is ordinarily
a stronger proxy but more susceptible to errors and
manipulations and book value of equity per share as
ameasure of a signal that isordinarily aweakerproxy
but less susceptible to errors andmanipulations. We
measured earnings per share as the firm’s net income
before extraordinary items during a fiscal year di-
vided by the number of shares outstanding at the end
of the fiscal year, and book value of equity per share
as stockholder’s equity at the end of a fiscal year di-
vided by the number of shares outstanding at the end
of the fiscal year. As before, the per-share basis
6 Our data have one-to-one matching at the firm level.
The discrepancy at the firm-year level is due to some
missing annual data. Past studies have indicated that
finding a statistically significantmoderating effect using an
unbalanced sample is harder than using a balanced sample
(Aguinis, 1995; Aguinis, Beaty, Boik, & Pierce, 2005), and
hence our dataset provides a conservative test of our
hypotheses.
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effectively controls for differences in sizes across
firms (Barth & Clinch, 2009). Both variables were
obtained from Compustat. For conciseness, we also
refer to earnings per share as “earnings” and book
value of equity per share as “book value.”
Types of restatements. To capture and control for
the general tenor of the stock market in a particular
industry at that point in time, or to control broadly for
potential endogeneity, as mentioned above, we in-
clude the matching (i.e., nonrestating) firms in our
analyses. This inclusion allows us to ascertain
whether the effect of a restatement clearly occurs due
to the restatement event or to some other confound-
ing changes in the broader environment before and
after that event. Depending on the hypotheseswe are
testing, we created different dummy variables. In
models that test the effect of violation of expectations
by comparing restatement and nonrestatement cases
in Hypotheses 1, 2, 5, and 6, we create a non-time-
varying Restated dummy variable that takes the
valueof 1 if a firmbelongs to a restating firmand0 if it
belongs to a matching firm.
However, in models that distinguish the effects of
severity of the violation to test Hypotheses 3, 4, 7,
and 8, we estimate the data differently. We first
create a new No Restatement dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 if a firm belongs to a nonrestating
firm and 0 otherwise. Next, we create another
new dummy variable, Downward Restatement, that
takes the value of 1 for downward restatement cases
only and 0 for the rest (i.e., for upward restatement
cases and matching firms). We then introduce both
new dummies, No Restatement and Downward Re-
statement, together in the model (to be clear, we no
longer include the earlier Restated dummy in this
set of models). This combined use of the No Re-
statement and Downward Restatement dummies
effectively relegates the upward restatement cases to
the reference category, which allows us to directly
and statistically compare its effect against the effect
of downward restatement cases through the Down-
ward Restatement dummy, while still controlling
for theirmatching firms through theNoRestatement
dummy.
For example, let us suppose we have firm A that
restates upward, firm B that restates downward, firm
C that is the match for firm A and that does not re-
state, and firm D that is the match for firm B and that
also does not restate. In this case, theNoRestatement
dummy will be 1 for firm C and D, and 0 for firm A
and B; the Downward Restatement dummy will be 1
for firmB, and 0 for firmA, C, andD. Thismeans that
only firm A has not been assigned a value of 1, and
this is as it should be because firm A as the upward
restating firm serves as the reference category. We
revisit this point when we discuss our regression
results below.
Time period dummies. Up to this point, we can
construct a regression model with stock price as
the dependent variable and earnings and book
value as the independent variables and so estimate
shareholders’ reliance on these signals, while con-
trolling for restatement types and confounding factors
through the inclusion of matching firms. However,
because we intend to estimate the differences of
signal reliance across different periods, we need to
construct various time dummy variables as cova-
riates and include the interactions between different
time dummies and each of the signals.
Post-restatement time dummy. For Hypothesis 1
to Hypothesis 4, we intend to measure the differ-
ences in shareholders’ relative reliance on a given
signal between a pre-restatement period and a post-
restatement period. We defined Post-restatement
Time as 0 if a firm-year was between 25 and 21
years, both years inclusive, relative to the firm’s re-
statement year, and 1 if a firm-year was between
0 and 3 years, inclusive, relative to the firm’s re-
statement year but before any CEO replacement.
We removed firm-years after a CEO replacement
to eliminate the effect of this change, which re-
flects firm actions to repair its evaluation fol-
lowing financial misconduct (Pfarrer et al., 2008).
Each matching observation is also assigned
the restatement date of the restating firm it is
matched to.
Following the above example, if the upward
restating firm A announced its restatement on Feb-
ruary 15, 2003, then this date became the focal event
date for the paired matching firm C. This means the
Post-restatement Time dummy for firms A and C
would then take the value of 0 before 2003 and 1 in
and after 2003 (but before any CEO replacement).
If for example, the downward restating firm B an-
nounced its restatement on August 20, 2004, then
this date became the focal event date for the paired
matching firm D. This means that the Post-
restatement Time dummy for firms B and D would
take the value of 0 before 2004 and1 in and after 2004
(but before any CEO replacement).
Post-CEO replacement time dummy. For Hy-
potheses 5– 8, we examined firm rehabilitative effort
as reflected through incumbent CEO replacements
that occurred between the restatement year and the
three years following a restatement announcement,
inclusive. To ensure that we focused on cases in
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which the CEO was replaced and did not retire or
move onto the board, we carefully examined each
occurrence of CEO replacement using several sour-
ces. First, we downloaded news from Lexis-Nexis
pertaining to the focal firm from one year prior to the
year of the CEO succession event to one year after the
year of the CEO succession event. This three-year
window allows us to better understand the rationale
behind the CEO’s replacement. We also examined
SEC filings in which the succession of the CEO
was mentioned. Second, following past studies
(Finkelstein et al., 2009; Shen & Cannella, 2002), we
removed any cases in which the CEO departure was
characterized as having resulted from death, health
issues, or from taking up a CEO position in another
firm, or in which the CEOwas an interim CEO in the
first place. We also excluded cases in which the
succession was a result of a long-term plan for re-
tirement or when the CEO continued to stay in the
firm, typically as chairman, since such an event re-
flects a lingering presence of the CEO and does
not represent a purposeful replacement (Finkelstein
et al., 2009). Finally, while some of the replacements
were preceded by mentions of poor performance, we
did not restrict our sample of replacements to only
those firms experiencing poor performance, since
past studies have shown that even high-performing
firms can violate expectations and subsequently re-
place their CEOs (Harris & Bromiley, 2007; Mishina
et al., 2010). Altogether, we are confident that our
careful analyses captured relevant CEO replace-
ments. Toexamine the effect ofCEO replacement,we
also restrict our sample to those that involve a CEO
replacement (we run robustness checks below on
this sample restriction).
We defined Post-CEO Replacement Time as 0 if
a firm-year observation occurred prior to the in-
cumbent CEO replacement year but after a restate-
ment had occurred, and 1 if the observation occurred
after an incumbent CEO replacement, following
a restatement, and up to three years following a re-
statement announcement (inclusive), which is the
end of our observation window. Using this method,
we restricted this portion of our analyses to periods
between the restatement year and the three years
following a restatement announcement, inclusive,
and across the periods before and after the replace-
ment of an incumbent CEO.
We applied a similar definition of the Post-CEO
Replacement Time variable for the matching firms
byusing the actual incumbentCEO replacement date
for the matching firm. Following the above example,
after we identified a matching firm C (or D), we then
tracked the CEO replacement of the matching firm C
just as we would for other firms. For example, if
a CEO was replaced in firm C after its assigned re-
statement date (i.e., on or after February 15, 2003 in
the example above), we identified it as such. If no
replacement occurred, we noted this accordingly. In
this regard, we recorded the CEO replacement in any
firms, matching or restating, as it occurred naturally.
For example, if the upward restating firm A
replaced its CEO on December 15, 2004, then the
Post-CEO Replacement Time would be 0 in 2003
(i.e., after the restatement in February 15, 2003 but
before CEO replacement), and 1 in 2004, 2005, and
2006 (i.e., up to three years after the restatement year
of 2003). If the matching firm C replaced its CEO on
July 1, 2005, then the Post-CEO Replacement Time
for firm Cwould be 0 in 2003 and 2004 (i.e., after the
matched date on February 15, 2003 but before CEO
replacement), and 1 in 2005 and 2006 (i.e., up to
three years after the matched restatement year of
2003). As can be seen, this coding system allows us
to distinguish periods before and after CEO re-
placement without forcing the CEO replacement
dates to be similar across firms, which would be
unnatural. Effectively, we have a rigorous control
with the matching firms, yet natural observations of
CEO replacements.
To clarify even further, these Post-restatement
Time and Post-CEOReplacement Timedummies are
different from the Restated dummy in both their
operationalization and purpose. For instance, the
Post-Restatement Time and Post-CEO Replacement
Time dummies are time-varying covariates that
separate the years before a restatement (or CEO re-
placement) and the years after. In contrast, the
Restated dummy (as well as theNo Restatement and
Downward Restatement dummies) is a non-time-
varying covariate that takes the value of 1 for a firm
that restated and 0 for a matching firm. Further, the
inclusion of matching firms and the Restated
dummy aims to control for potential confounding
factors, such as the general tenor of themarket, and to
differentiate between the different types of re-
statement, but not to examine the pre- andpost-effect
of a particular event—such as a restatement or CEO
replacement, which is captured by the Post-
Restatement Time and Post-CEO Replacement
Time dummies respectively. They thus serve dif-
ferent purposes and involve different operationali-
zations despite some similarity in their names.
Control variables. In addition to including the
matching firms as a quasi-experimental design con-
trol, we included other controls. We controlled for
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firm age at the time a restatement occurred and firm
size using firm revenue for the year prior to the re-
statement announcement. Firm performance was
controlled using ROA based on the restated earnings
(except for matching firms, since they never restated
their earnings in the first place) to better reflect the
true performance of the firm. We also controlled for
whether a firm was eventually merged within three
years from a restatement date. The annual tempo-
ral variation was controlled using year dummies
(2003–2006)with 2003 being the reference year. To
minimize the effect of any outliers, we Winsorized
financial variables for each firm-year at the 1st and
99th percentile (Dechow, Ge, & Schrand, 2010).
Estimation Models
To examine the extent to which shareholders rely
on the different signals to evaluate a firm, we
employed an OLS model to regress firm stock price
against earnings and the book value of equity. This
model, which examines the association of various
accounting measures with firm value, has also been
called the “value relevance model” in the account-
ing literature and is used to measure the extent to
which investors rely on certain signals in evaluating
a firm, which is reflected by the estimated co-
efficients of these variables (Brown, Lo, & Lys, 1999;
Easton &Harris, 1991); such coefficients then reflect
the relevance of certain signals in estimating the
value of a firm, which gives rise to the name of the
model.
Since we have controlled for potential endoge-
neity through the matching process that serves as
a quasi-experiment and the inclusion of various
control variables, and because of the continuous
nature of our dependent variable, OLS provides the
best linear unbiased estimator. The use of three-way
interactions to test our hypotheses (more below)
further reduces any concern of confounding errors
due to omitted variables, since any such variable
would need to correlate with our first-, second-, and
third-order variables in such a way that supports our
hypotheses (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2002).
This is extremely unlikely.We used clustered robust
standard error to minimize the effect of hetero-
skedasticity and because we have multiple observa-
tions per firm (Cohen et al., 2002).
RESULTS
We report descriptive statistics for the variables in
Table 1. To test for multicollinearity, the condition
index (Belsley, Kuh, &Welsch, 2004) was calculated
and none of the condition numberswere greater than
30, which is the suggested threshold for multi-
collinearity. The variance inflation factor (VIF) was
also below the recommended cutoff of 10 (Cohen
et al., 2002), suggesting that multicollinearity is not
likely to be an issue. Importantly, Stata also auto-
matically drops covariates whenmulticollinearity is
a serious concern (Kohler & Kreuter, 2009); none of
ours were dropped.
Effect of Violation of Expectations (Restatement)
As all of our hypotheses aim to predict how the
effect of a certain signal might differ over time pe-
riods andacross restating andmatching firms,weuse
a three-way interaction between restatement, post-
restatement time, and signal variables (earnings or
book value) after including all the lower-order in-
teractions. For each signal, the coefficients of signal
(i.e., earningsorbookvalue)3post-restatement time3
restated is therefore the degree to which share-
holder reliance on the signal differs between dif-
ferent time periods due to restatement, once the
effect of thematching firms andother control variables
have been taken into account. To find support for
our hypotheses, we relied on three indicators for
triangulation: (a) the three-way interactions in our
models, (b) the interaction plots, and (c) the simple
slope differences (Dawson&Richter, 2006).We take
a conservative approach to our hypothesis testing by
claiming support for our hypotheses when all three
indicators are consistent and supportive.
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we refer to Table 2.
Model 1 reports the base model with only control
variables, before we successively add variables to
arrive at the Model 4. We focus on Model 4, which
also shows a significantly better fit than the more
restricted models. In Model 4, the interaction be-
tween restated, earnings, and post-restatement time
is negative but not significant (b52 0.88, p. 0.10).
The interaction plot and the simple slope test also
suggest no significant difference in the reliance on
earnings before and after a restatement (plot not
shown because the effect is not significant). As such,
Hypothesis 1 does not seem to receive any support.
To test Hypothesis 2, we start by examining the
three-way interaction for book value, which is posi-
tive (b 5 0.89, p , 0.001). This coefficient indicates
that shareholders would rely more on book value of
equity following a restatement, which is consistent
with Hypothesis 2. The interaction plot and simple
slope test below also support this hypothesis.
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Altogether, these indicators consistently support
Hypothesis 2.
Relative Effects of Violation Severity (Downward
versus Upward Restatements)
To test Hypotheses 3 and 4, we refer to Table 3.
We start by examining the three-way interaction
between earnings, downward restatement dummy,
and post-restatement time dummy in Model 4. This
coefficient is negative and significant (b 5 2 1.20,
p , 0.05), suggesting that following a restatement
announcement, the reliance on earnings in down-
ward restatements is lower than in upward re-
statements, which is consistent with Hypothesis 3.
The interaction plot in Figure 2 and the simple slope
TABLE 2
Effects of Restatements
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Firm age 0.041 0.031 0.03 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ROA 25.15*** 10.57*** 21.32*** 10.59***
(1.57) (1.95) (1.56) (1.56)
Merger 22.341 22.371 22.71* 22.391
(1.34) (1.27) (1.37) (1.27)
Firm size 0.88*** 0.79*** 0.81*** 0.74***
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10)
Year 2004 1.52 1.20 1.92 1.55
(1.41) (1.27) (1.31) (1.21)
Year 2005 1.33 0.95 0.91 0.81
(1.33) (1.17) (1.19) (1.12)
Year 2006 20.38 20.89 20.19 20.64
(1.37) (1.26) (1.28) (1.20)
Restated 20.07 0.76 20.92 20.73
(1.13) (0.91) (1.61) (1.47)
Post-restatement time 2.43** 1.29 4.26*** 3.19**
(0.78) (0.81) (0.97) (1.08)
Restated3 post-restatement time 0.58 0.09 28.43*** 26.72***
(1.07) (1.12) (1.64) (1.62)
Signal: Earnings per share 2.62*** 2.10***
(0.58) (0.36)
Restated3 earnings 20.75 20.61
(0.58) (0.45)
Earnings3 post-restatement time 20.26 0.76
(0.83) (0.52)
Restated3 earnings3 post-restatement time 1.97* 20.88
(0.97) (0.69)
Signal: Book value of equity per share 0.19** 0.13*
(0.07) (0.06)
Restated3 book value 0.18 0.21
(0.15) (0.14)
Book value3 post-restatement time 20.141 20.19**
(0.07) (0.06)
Restated3 book value3 post-restatement time 0.93*** 0.89***
(0.18) (0.17)
Constant 14.80*** 13.77*** 13.04*** 12.76***
(1.58) (1.42) (1.61) (1.47)
Observations 6,249 6,209 6,209 6,209
R2 0.21 0.32 0.32 0.38
F 42.06 41.10 48.25 48.27
Prob. . F 0 0 0 0
1 p , 0.1
*p , 0.05
**p , 0.01
***p , 0.001; two-sided tests.
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test below also support this hypothesis. Altogether,
these indicators consistently support Hypothesis 3.
To test Hypothesis 4, we examine the three-way
interaction between book value, downward restate-
ment dummy, and post-restatement time dummy in
Model 4. This coefficient is positive and significant
(b 5 0.82, p , 0.001), suggesting that following a re-
statement announcement the reliance on book value
in downward restatements is higher than in upward
restatements, which is consistent with Hypothesis 4.
TABLE 3
Effect of Severity of Restatement
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Firm age 0.041 0.031 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ROA 25.13*** 10.38*** 20.96*** 10.72***
(1.57) (1.99) (1.52) (1.62)
Merger 22.391 22.471 22.92* 22.65*
(1.34) (1.27) (1.37) (1.28)
Firm size 0.87*** 0.79*** 0.81*** 0.74***
(0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Year 2004 1.57 1.27 1.66 1.28
(1.41) (1.27) (1.30) (1.21)
Year 2005 1.40 1.02 0.79 0.68
(1.33) (1.17) (1.19) (1.12)
Year 2006 20.34 20.79 20.05 20.52
(1.37) (1.26) (1.28) (1.21)
No restatement 2.581 1.68 2.05 1.47
(1.41) (1.24) (1.26) (1.18)
Downward restatement 3.59** 3.29** 0.88 0.87
(1.21) (1.15) (1.73) (1.74)
Post-restatement time 2.89*** 1.59* 4.46*** 3.45***
(0.69) (0.72) (0.90) (1.00)
Downward restatement 3 post-restatement time 20.37 20.61 28.15*** 26.82***
(1.11) (1.16) (1.74) (1.85)
Signal: Earnings per share 2.39*** 1.90***
(0.51) (0.32)
Downward restatement 3 earnings 20.26 20.47
(0.54) (0.41)
Earnings3 post-restatement time 0.03 0.97*
(0.78) (0.46)
Downward restatement3 earnings3post-restatement
time
1.39 21.20*
(0.97) (0.64)
Signal: Book value of equity per share 0.19** 0.14*
(0.07) (0.06)
Downward restatement 3 book value 0.33* 0.311
(0.17) (0.17)
Book value3 post-restatement time 20.131 20.19**
(0.07) (0.07)
Downward restatement 3 book value3 post-
restatement time
0.80*** 0.82***
(0.20) (0.21)
Constant 12.01*** 11.98*** 10.80*** 11.08***
(1.56) (1.48) (1.58) (1.48)
Observations 6,249 6,209 6,209 6,209
R2 0.21 0.32 0.31 0.37
F 38.16 38.30 43.40 44.31
Prob. . F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 p , 0.1
*p , 0.05
**p , 0.01
***p , 0.001; two-sided tests.
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The interaction plot in Figure 3 and the simple slope
test below also support this hypothesis. Altogether,
these indicators consistently support Hypothesis 4.
Interaction plots and effect size. Figures 1 to 3
depict the above interactions. In all figures, we plotted
the results from the 5th to the 95th percentile of the
observedrange toavoid theextremerange, andmarked
several points with equal intervals along the line (al-
though the choice to use these points does not change
the slopeof the linesor theconclusions).Weplottedall
the graphs using Stata marginsplot and indicated the
95% confidence intervals. For Hypothesis 2, Figure 1
shows how the line for restating firms after a restate-
ment (solid linewith solid squaremarker) ismarkedly
steeper than the line for restating firms before a re-
statement (solid line with solid diamond marker), in-
dicating an increased reliance on the book value
following a restatement. Consistent with the test for
simple slope difference, which is significant at p ,
0.001, the effect size confirms a substantial difference
in the effect of book value between the two periods.
The confidence intervals between the twoperiods also
do not overlap. Practically, a $1 change in book value
had a $0.33 effect on stock price before a restatement
but a $1.04 effect after, indicating shareholders’ greater
reliance on book value following a restatement, as
posited inHypothesis 2.Figure1also showsaminimal
effect of the post-restatement time dummy for the
matching firm, which is as expected since the match-
ing firm has not announced any restatement.7
Regarding the difference in the reliance on earnings
between upward and downward restatements posited
in Hypothesis 3, Figure 2 shows how the effect of
earnings differs before an upward versus a downward
restatement. While the change in reliance on earnings
before and after a downward restatement (solid line
with soliddiamondmarker versus solid linewith solid
square marker, respectively) seems minimal and sta-
tistically insignificant based on a test of simple slope
difference (p . 0.1), a similar change before and after
an upward restatement (dotted line with hollow tri-
angle marker versus dotted line with hollow circle
marker, respectively) is more visible and statistically
significant (p , 0.01). In fact, there seems to be
a greater, not lesser, reliance on earnings following an
upward restatement, which makes sense because
stakeholders actually benefit more due to previous
understatementsofearnings inupward-restating firms.
Practically, in the case of less severe (i.e., upward) re-
statements, a $1 change in earnings had a $1.90 effect
on stock price before a restatement but a $2.87 effect
after; whereas, in the case of more severe (i.e., down-
ward) restatements, a $1 change in earnings had
a $1.43 effect on stock price before a restatement and
a $1.20 effect after. Altogether, this pattern supports
Hypothesis 3, that violation severity matters and that
stakeholders change their calculus accordingly.
Similarly, regarding the difference in the reliance
on book value between upward and downward
restatements outlined in Hypothesis 4, refer to
Figure 3.While the reliance onbookvalue before and
after a downward restatement (solid line with solid
diamond marker versus solid line with solid square
marker, respectively) significantly increases based
on a test of simple slope difference (p , 0.001), the
reliance on book value before and after an upward
restatement (dotted line with hollow trianglemarker
versus dotted line with hollow circle marker, re-
spectively) actually decreases (p, 0.001). In relation
to Hypothesis 3, this could be because stakeholders
rely on earnings more than on book value following
an upward restatement. Practically, for less severe
(i.e., upward) restatements, a $1 change in the book
value had a $0.14 effect on stock price before a re-
statement, but a –$0.05 effect after, while, for more
severe (i.e., downward) restatements, a $1 change in
the book value had a $0.45 effect on stock price be-
fore a restatement but a $1.07 effect after. Altogether,
this evidence supports Hypothesis 4. More broadly,
following a more severe violation stakeholders in-
crease their relative reliance on signals that are less
susceptible to errors and manipulations.8
Effects of Rehabilitative Efforts (CEO Replacement)
Following Violation (Restatement)
To test Hypotheses 5 and 6, we refer to Table 4.
To test Hypothesis 5, we refer to Model 4 and start
with the three-way interaction for earnings, which is
positive (b 5 3.31, p , 0.05). This coefficient in-
dicates that shareholders will rely more on earnings
after a CEO replacement following a restatement,
7 The line for matching firms where time is equal to 1 in
Figure 1 seems to be downward sloping, suggesting that an
increase in book value decreases the stock price.We tested
the simple slope significance of this line and found it to be
not statistically different from zero (p value is 0.340), thus
eliminating this concern.
8 The line for upward restating firmswhere time is equal
to 1 in Figure 3 seems to be downward sloping, suggesting
that an increase in book value decreases stock price. We
tested the simple slope significance of this line and found it
to be not statistically different from zero (p value is 0.411),
thus eliminating this concern.
2017 569Gomulya and Mishina
which is consistent with Hypothesis 5. The interac-
tion plot in Figure 4 and the simple slope test below
also support this hypothesis. Altogether, these indi-
cators consistently support Hypothesis 5.
To test Hypothesis 6, we first examine the three-
way interaction for book value, which is negative
(b 5 2 0.94, p , 0.01). This coefficient indicates
that shareholders will rely less on book value after
a CEO replacement following a restatement, which is
consistent with Hypothesis 6. The interaction plot
in Figure 5 and the simple slope test below also
support this hypothesis. Altogether, these indicators
consistently support Hypothesis 6.
Effect of rehabilitative efforts (CEO replace-
ment) following different violation severity (down-
ward versus upward restatements).TotestHypotheses
7 and 8, we refer to Table 5. To test Hypothesis 7, we
first examine the three-way interaction between
earnings, downward restatement dummy, and post-
CEO replacement time dummy in Model 4. The
coefficient is positive and significant (b5 2.45, p,
0.05), suggesting that after a CEO replacement fol-
lowing a restatement announcement the reliance on
earnings in downward restatement cases increases
more than in upward restatement cases, which is
consistent with Hypothesis 7. The interaction plot
and simple slope test below also support this hy-
pothesis. Altogether, these indicators consistently
support Hypothesis 7.
To test Hypothesis 8, we first examine the three-
way interaction between book value, downward re-
statement dummy, and post-CEO replacement time
dummy in Model 4. This coefficient is negative and
significant (b 5 2 0.96, p , 0.01), suggesting that
following CEO replacement the reliance on book
value in downward restatement cases decreases
more than in upward restatement cases, which is
consistent with Hypothesis 8. The interaction plot
and simple slope test below also support this hy-
pothesis. Altogether, these indicators consistently
support Hypothesis 8.
Interaction plots and effect size. To visualize the
interactions, we plotted them in Figures 4 to 7,
which also include the 95% confidence interval
indicators. Figure 4 shows how the effect of earn-
ings differs before and after a CEO replacement
following a restatement. The line following a re-
statement but before a CEO replacement (solid line
with solid diamond marker) is flat, while the line
for restating firms after CEO replacement (solid
line with solid square marker) is upward sloping,
indicating an increased reliance on earnings when
a CEO is replaced following a restatement. Practi-
cally, a $1 change in earnings had a $0.02 effect on
the stock price after a restatement but before a CEO
replacement and a $1.96 effect after the CEO re-
placement. The difference in the simple slope test
is also significant (p , 0.001). This finding
FIGURE 1
Effects of Restatement versus No Restatement, Book Value of Equity, and Post-Restatement Time
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supports Hypothesis 5. Figure 4 also shows that the
effect of CEO replacement for the matching firm
actually goes the other way, revealing that a restat-
ing firm yields a different effect than nonrestating
firms.
Figure 5 shows how the effect of book value
differs before and after a CEO replacement fol-
lowing a restatement. Before a CEO replacement
following a restatement, shareholders rely to
a much greater extent on firms’ book value, as
FIGURE 2
Effects of Downward versus Upward Restatement, Earnings, and Post-Restatement Time
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FIGURE 3
Effects of Downward versus Upward Restatement, Book Value of Equity, and Post-Restatement Time
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shown by the solid line with solid diamond
marker. However, subsequent to the CEO re-
placement, the reliance on book value practically
disappears, as depicted by the solid line with solid
square marker, consistent with Hypothesis 6.
Consistentwith the test for simple slope difference
(p , 0.001), the effect size is also visible and
substantial. Practically, a $1 change in the book
value of equity had a $1.13 effect on the stock price
of the firm after a restatement but before a CEO
replacement and a $0.23 effect after the CEO re-
placement, indicating shareholders’ reduced re-
liance on book value when a CEO is replaced
following a restatement.
TABLE 4
Effect of CEO Replacement following Restatements
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Firm age 0.071 0.06* 0.03 0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ROA 30.85*** 14.96*** 26.02*** 17.08***
(3.44) (3.87) (3.45) (2.76)
Merger 3.02 5.92 4.65 5.49
(3.90) (4.52) (3.62) (3.83)
Firm size 0.82*** 0.67*** 0.70*** 0.62***
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10)
Year 2004 4.25 4.721 3.59 4.271
(3.06) (2.75) (2.72) (2.56)
Year 2005 21.68 20.29 21.45 20.44
(2.31) (2.26) (2.33) (2.18)
Year 2006 23.18 20.68 23.05 21.74
(2.89) (2.66) (2.73) (2.56)
Restated 20.02 1.60 27.95*** 26.74**
(2.66) (2.24) (2.38) (2.23)
Post-CEO replacement time 20.23 21.44 22.17 21.06
(2.77) (1.72) (2.04) (1.98)
Restated3 post-CEO replacement time 21.31 20.93 6.33* 5.69*
(3.32) (2.25) (2.83) (2.83)
Signal: Earnings per share 3.21** 3.16***
(1.08) (0.89)
Restated3 earnings 21.23 23.15***
(1.16) (0.92)
Earnings3 post-CEO replacement time 20.52 21.37
(1.43) (1.18)
Restated3 earnings3 post-CEO replacement time 1.31 3.31*
(1.54) (1.32)
Signal: Book value of equity per share 0.09 0.03
(0.13) (0.08)
Restated3 book value 0.98*** 1.10***
(0.23) (0.21)
Book value3 post-CEO replacement time 0.07 0.04
(0.14) (0.13)
Restated3 book value3 post-CEO replacement time 20.78* 20.94**
(0.31) (0.32)
Constant 15.60*** 12.43*** 15.99*** 13.58***
(3.10) (2.67) (2.95) (2.63)
Observations 1,060 1,057 1,057 1,057
R2 0.31 0.43 0.44 0.49
F 21.32 32.44 20.30 25.84
Prob. . F 0 0 0 0
1 p , 0.1
*p , 0.05
**p , 0.01
***p , 0.001; two-sided tests.
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Regarding the difference in the reliance on earn-
ings between upward and downward restatements
posited in Hypothesis 7, refer to Figure 6. While
the reliance on earnings before and after a CEO re-
placement following a downward restatement (solid
line with solid diamond marker versus solid line
with solid square marker, respectively) significantly
increases based on a simple slope test (p, 0.01), the
reliance on earnings before and after a CEO re-
placement following an upward restatement (dotted
FIGURE 4
Effects of Restatements, Earnings, and Post-CEO Replacement Time
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FIGURE 5
Effects of Restatements, Book Value of Equity, and Post-CEO Replacement Time
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line with hollow triangle marker versus dotted line
with hollow circle marker, respectively) is not sta-
tistically significant (p . 0.1). Practically, for less
severe (i.e., upward) restatements, a $1 change in
earnings had a $2.82 effect on the stock price of the
firm after a restatement but before a CEO replace-
ment and a $2.19 effect after the CEO replacement,
while for more severe (i.e., downward) restatements,
TABLE 5
Effect of CEO Replacement following different Restatement Severity
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Firm age 0.071 0.061 0.04 0.04
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ROA 30.84*** 15.07*** 26.50*** 17.05***
(3.43) (3.96) (3.40) (2.79)
Merger 3.00 6.20 4.48 5.91
(3.91) (4.51) (3.61) (4.08)
Firm size 0.82*** 0.68*** 0.74*** 0.65***
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Year 2004 4.21 4.631 3.68 4.18
(3.05) (2.76) (2.75) (2.58)
Year 2005 21.65 20.18 21.42 20.32
(2.32) (2.28) (2.36) (2.19)
Year 2006 23.13 20.60 22.52 21.18
(2.88) (2.65) (2.71) (2.54)
No restatement 1.94 0.87 0.45 0.64
(2.71) (2.02) (2.33) (1.99)
Downward restatement 2.04 2.30 27.36** 26.40**
(3.00) (2.54) (2.52) (2.41)
Post-CEO replacement time 20.48 22.04 22.06 21.54
(2.32) (1.56) (1.89) (1.81)
Downward restatement3 post-CEO replacement time 21.10 20.05 6.83* 6.77*
(3.09) (2.27) (2.82) (2.87)
Signal: Earnings per share 2.91** 2.82***
(0.94) (0.75)
Downward restatement 3 earnings 20.82 22.89***
(1.04) (0.83)
Earnings3 post-CEO replacement time 20.13 20.62
(1.23) (1.00)
Downward restatement 3 earnings3 post-CEO
replacement time
0.70 2.45*
(1.39) (1.19)
Signal: Book value of equity per share 0.11 0.05
(0.14) (0.09)
Downward restatement 3 book value 1.00*** 1.14***
(0.28) (0.27)
Book value3 post-CEO replacement time 0.06 0.00
(0.14) (0.14)
Downward restatement 3 book value3 post-CEO
replacement time
20.84* 20.96**
(0.35) (0.36)
Constant 13.78*** 11.92*** 14.88*** 12.70***
(3.28) (2.62) (2.69) (2.41)
Observations 1,060 1,057 1,057 1,057
R2 0.31 0.43 0.43 0.48
F 19.25 28.43 17.02 21.46
Prob. . F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 p , 0.1
*p , 0.05
**p , 0.01
***p , 0.001; two-sided tests.
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a $1 change in earnings had a –$0.08 effect on the
firm stock price after a restatement but before a CEO
replacement, but a $1.75 effect after the CEO re-
placement.9 Altogether, these results support Hy-
pothesis 7, that violation severity matters and that
stakeholders seem to revise their calculus to a greater
extent when the rehabilitative effort follows a more
severe violation.
Interestingly, we also note that the difference be-
tween the slopes for downward and upward re-
statement after CEO replacement (solid line with
solid square marker and dotted line with hollow
circle marker, respectively) is minimal and not sig-
nificant (p . 0.1) based on a simple slope test. This
suggests that CEO replacement causes not only
a stronger reaction after downward restatements but
also a final level of reliance that is about the same for
both restatement types.
Finally, refer to Figure 7 for the difference in the
reliance on book value between upward and down-
ward restatements outlined in Hypothesis 8. While
the reliance on book value both before and after
a CEO replacement following a downward restate-
ment (solid line with solid diamond marker versus
solid line with solid square marker, respectively)
significantly decreases based on a simple slope test
(p,0.01), the reliance on bookvalue before and after
aCEO replacement following anupward restatement
(dotted line with hollow triangle marker versus
dotted line with hollow circle marker, respectively)
is not statistically significant (p . 0.1). Practically,
for less severe (i.e., upward) restatements, a $1
change in the book value of equity had a $0.05 effect
on the firm stock price after a restatement but before
a CEO replacement and a similar $0.05 effect after
the CEO replacement, while for more severe (i.e.,
downward) restatements, a $1 change in book value
had a $1.18 effect on stock price after a restatement
but before a CEO replacement, but a $0.23 effect after
the CEO replacement. Consistent with Hypothesis 8,
this suggests that stakeholders seem to revise their
calculus to a greater extent when the rehabilitative
effort follows a more severe, and hence likely more
recallable, violation.
As per earlier findings, however, we also note that
the difference between the book value slopes for
downward and upward restatement after CEO re-
placement (solid line with solid square marker and
dotted line with hollow circle marker, respectively)
is minimal and not significant (p . 0.1) based on
a simple slope test, which suggests the possibility of
a rather successful rehabilitative effort.
Overall, we reveal supportive evidence and im-
portant nuances for seven out of eight of our
FIGURE 6
Effects of Downward versus Upward Restatement, Earnings, and Post-CEO Replacement Time
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9 The line for downward-restating firms where time is
equal to 0 in Figure 6 is slightly negative but not significant
(p 5 0.844).
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hypotheses. We found that shareholders do increase
their reliance on book value following a restatement
(supporting Hypothesis 2) and reverse these changes
if there is a subsequentCEO replacement (supporting
Hypotheses 5 and 6). The differences in share-
holders’ reliance on these signals are also stronger
following a more severe violation (supporting Hy-
potheses 3 and 4). Likewise, the reversal on their
reliance following a rehabilitative effort is also
stronger following a more severe violation (sup-
porting Hypotheses 7 and 8). Interestingly, although
stakeholders react more strongly to CEO replace-
ment following a more severe violation, ultimately
the levels of stakeholders’ reliance on each signal
after a CEO replacement following more and less
severe violations are fairly equal, suggesting a rather
successful rehabilitative effort.
Robustness Checks
Alternative rehabilitative efforts.Wereexamined
a firm’s rehabilitative efforts by including not only
CEO replacement but also CFO replacement, audit
committeemember replacement, andoutsidedirector
replacement, which can occur after a restatement
(Arthaud-Day et al., 2006). To do so, we first created
four time-varying dummies that capture the occur-
rence of any of these actions. For example, the CFO
replacement dummy takes the value of 1 after a CFO
replacement has occurred and 0 beforehand. Similar
coding is applied to the other three types of re-
habilitative efforts. We then created a time-varying
count variable that sums up these dummies, ranging
from0 to 4, and used it to replace the earlier Post-CEO
Replacement Time dummy. We then multiplied this
count variable with the earnings and book value var-
iables to create the necessary three-way interactions.
We continued to find consistent support for Hypoth-
esis 5 to Hypothesis 8 using this alternative measure,
whether through the three-way interactions, interac-
tion plots, or simple slope tests. Altogether, these re-
sults indicate that more rehabilitative efforts can
effectively influence stakeholders’ evaluation.
We also compared reliance on earnings and book
value between restating firms that replaced their
CEOs against restating firms that had no CEO re-
placement within three years after a restatement.
Using this between-firm comparison instead of the
within-firm comparisons we conducted earlier, we
still found consistent support for Hypotheses 5– 8.
Multiple restatements. Certain firms in the GAO
sample announced more than one restatement. Al-
though our sample already captures the first in-
stance of such a restatement to capture the first
market reaction, we further checked the robustness
of our findings by dropping all observations for any
firm that restated more than once, along with ob-
servations for its respective matching firm.We then
FIGURE 7
Effects of Downward versus Upward Restatement, Book Value of Equity, and Post-CEO Replacement Time
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re-ran all the analyses and found the results to be
identical.
Earnings surprises. Next, we considered the
possibility that the replacement of a newCEOmaybe
accompanied by earnings “surprises” in order to
provide the CEOwith a positive reception among the
stakeholders and to build a narrative that the CEO is
taking control or effecting change (Graffin et al.,
2011). To examine this possibility, we ran separate
analyses to test the difference in the level of earnings
surprises in the year right before and right after aCEO
replacement. We found that, in both the sample that
consists of only the restating firms and the one that
also contains the matching firms, no significant dif-
ference exists between these two years, suggesting
that earnings surprises factor minimally into our
observations.
Fiscal year end. Some of our observations pertain
to firms that end their fiscal year in December. As the
last trading day of a calendar year, December data
may contain anomalies because they are used as the
last opportunity to lock in gains for the tax year, and
trading may be required at very large institutional
investors in order to rebalance portfolios. For a ro-
bustness check,we thenused stockprice at the endof
November for all our firms that ended their fiscal
year in December. The results remained consistent,
suggesting minimal concern for this potential
complication.
Heckmanmodel for CEO replacement. In testing
Hypotheses 5–8, we restricted the sample to only
firms that experienced CEO replacement becausewe
wanted to examine the effect of such a rehabilitative
effort. To increase generalizability, we ran a two-
stage analysis using a Heckman model by regressing
CEO replacement, the dependent variable in the first
stage, against firm age, ROA, merger dummy, firm
size, year dummies, restatement dummy, proportion
of inside directors, proportion of directors appointed
by CEO, along with two instrumental variables that
affect the outcome in the first stage but not the out-
come in the second stage, which is stock price
(Heckman, 1979). These instruments are Incumbent
CEO Equity and Incumbent CEO–Chairman Duality
(1 when the CEO is the chairman of the board and
0 otherwise). While a CEO’s equity or position as
chairman can influence their probability of being
replaced asCEO (the outcome in the first stage), these
factors playno role in influencing the stock price (the
outcome in the second stage). In cases where re-
placement occurs (the sample for the second stage),
the incumbent CEOswere removed, and thus should
no longer influence the firm.
The results in the first stage indicate that ROA,
incumbent CEO equity, and incumbent CEO duality
decrease the probability of incumbent CEO re-
placement. Larger firmsaremore likely to replace the
CEO, as are firms that have restated. Some of the year
effects are significant but there is no discernible
pattern. More importantly, the results from the sec-
ond stage continue to support Hypotheses 5– 8,
bolstering the generalizability of our findings.
Propensity score. While in general a propensity
score can help to increase the quality of thematching
process (Guo & Fraser, 2010), our current matching
method is actuallymore rigorous than thepropensity
score approach. That is, we used a stratified exact
matching process based on the four-digit SIC and
restatement year, and nearest neighbor matching for
firm size. Matching based on the four-digit SIC code
can be considered very rigorous because prior re-
search has suggested that even two-digit SIC codes
already capture useful characteristics of an industry
(Porac,Wade, &Pollock, 1999). Further, various tests
indicate that our restating andmatching firms are not
statistically different across firm asset, revenue,
stockholders’ equity, net income, and ROA using
either t-test comparisons or the Kolmogorov–
Smirnov two-sample equality of distribution test.
Achieving this “balance” is a key reason behind us-
ing a propensity score for matching, a goal that we
already achieve here (Guo & Fraser, 2010). None-
theless, for a robustness check we also reanalyzed
our data by controlling for a propensity score.
To do so, we predicted the likelihood of a firm to
restate its earnings by using the restating status as
the dependent variables, and firm age, size, year
dummies, and ROA as the independent variables.
This analysis produced a propensity score for each
firm. We then included this propensity score as an
additional control when we predicted stock price
as a function of our hypothesized (and other con-
trol) variables. If the propensity of a firm to restate
may have confounded the effect of our hypothe-
sized variables, then this additional control should
have helped to minimize this concern. The results
of this robustness check continued to support our
hypotheses.
Other signals. Finally, we examined whether
other accounting information might serve as further
signals that are less susceptible to errors and ma-
nipulations following an earnings restatement. To
this end, we examined the potential of past earnings
to serve as a “clean” signal that shareholders might
rely upon following a restatement. To do this, we
used earnings information three years prior to an
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observation year (i.e., three years lagged), and
substituted this measure for book value. We chose
three years because no leakage is likely to occur three
years prior to an earnings announcement. Our ana-
lyses found that the reliance on lagged earnings in-
creases after a restatement and that this reliance is
higher in downward than in upward restatements, as
found earlier. Following CEO replacement, we also
see an increase in the reliance on earnings but a de-
crease in the reliance on lagged earnings.
Similarly, it is also possible that stakeholders
might rely more on revenue as a substitute for book
value, especially in restatement cases that are not
caused by revenue recognitions, and, consequently,
the revenue signal may still be considered “clean.”
To test for this, we first dropped all the restatements
caused by revenue-recognition issues, as indicated
by GAO and all its matching firms (the remainder
were caused by expense-recognition issues). We
then reran the same analyses. We found that the re-
liance on revenue increases after a restatement and
that this reliance is higher in downward than in up-
ward restatements. FollowingCEOreplacement after
a restatement, however, we do not see a significant
decrease in the reliance on revenue when compared
to nonrestatement cases, although there is an in-
crease in the reliance on earnings. We also do not
observe any significant difference in the decrease in
reliance on revenue betweenupward anddownward
restatements. Perhaps this is because revenue is
a signal that is often used to evaluate all firms, in-
cluding those that have replaced their CEOs follow-
ingupwardanddownward restatements.Altogether,
these findings are broadly consistent with our find-
ings using book value, and suggest that stakeholders
may search beyond book value of equity for signals
that are less susceptible to errors and manipulations
than earnings following earnings misrepresentation.
Finally, another concern is that the increase in
reliance on book value is solely because earnings
restatements specifically compromise earnings as
a signal. To address this issue, we ran another set of
robustness checks by replacing earnings with cash
flow from operations in the models. Pairing book
value with cash flow from operations resulted in
a similar conclusion. We saw similar and significant
changes in the reliance on book value.We also found
a decrease in the reliance on cash flow following
a restatement, but this tendency reverses following a
rehabilitative effort. This is not surprising, because
while cash flow is an indicator of firm performance,
it is still an annual measure that is quite prone to
errors andmanipulations. Based on these robustness
checks, we feel confident that our results are driven
by our theorizing and not just by the fact that the
misconduct we chose to examine was related to one
of the signals.
DISCUSSION
Our results are largely consistent with our pre-
dictions: namely that in evaluating a firm following
a violation of expectations, investors will shift their
relative reliance toward signals that are ordinarily
weaker proxies but less susceptible to errors and
manipulations, but that they will shift their reliance
back to earlier patterns following rehabilitative ef-
forts. Our findings thus suggest that stakeholders
adjust the underlying strategy used to evaluate firms
when signalers become less credible. We also found
that these effects are stronger following amore severe
violation. That is, following a more severe violation
(in downward instead of upward restating firms),
shareholders rely more on less susceptible signals
(book value), which is consistent with their reduced
reliance on more susceptible signals (earnings).
However, this effect also reversesmore strongly after
rehabilitative efforts following a more severe viola-
tion, which could be because a more negative event
likely registers more in themind of stakeholders and
makes any rehabilitative efforts afterward more
meaningful.
Altogether, our paper offers the following theo-
retical contributions. First, it contributes to the un-
derstanding of how shareholders react to violation of
expectations by firms by showing that investors’ re-
actions are not limited to changes in their evalua-
tions of the firm but also extend to changes in the
underlying process that investors use to evaluate the
firm. Although prior research has shown that earn-
ings and book value determine stock prices (Barth &
Clinch, 2009; Francis & Schipper, 1999; Ohlson,
1995), few studies have examined whether or how
events such as violation of expectations can influ-
ence relative investor reliance on these two signals,
or, more broadly, whether investors change the
process by which they evaluate firms. At the same
time, we also show that investors are willing to re-
verse their earlier decisions and revert to their earlier
evaluative process after rehabilitative efforts by the
focal firm, which shows how the effect of a violation
of expectation can be temporary.
These findings also suggest that the evaluation
process fundamentally changes as the relative im-
portance placed on different signals changes after
violations. This suggests that the process by which
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a firm gains a favorable evaluation in the first place is
likely to differ compared to the process by which
a firm might repair a damaged one, as suggested by
prior theoretical treatments (e.g.,Mishina et al., 2012;
Rhee & Valdez, 2009). Consequently, a set of other-
wise favorable signals by a firm that has engaged in
a violation of expectations may not lead to the same
evaluation for a firm that has not engaged in a viola-
tion. Hence, what might have worked to improve the
firm’s evaluation in the past may no longer be suffi-
cient after the violation of stakeholder expectations
because their relative reliance on particular signals
has changed. This also suggests that perhaps the
“reputational loss” that firmsexperience fromcertain
types of actions (Karpoff et al., 2008a; Karpoff & Lott,
1993) results not only from the attempts by investors
topunish the firm,but also fromthe fact that investors
place less credence on at least some of the positive
signals subsequently emanating from the firm.
Second, we contribute to signaling and screening
theory by distinguishing between two distinct sour-
ces of noise: noise inherent in the signal and noise
due to the behavior of the signaler. We suggest that
when the credibility of the signaler is compromised,
stakeholders may shift their relative reliance to sig-
nals that are less susceptible to errors and manipu-
lations because signaler credibility affects signals
differently. This dynamic suggests that the receivers’
perception of a given signal can be rather fleeting,
and can change depending on changes in the broader
context. Prior studies have discussed how the noise
inherent in a signal could change over time,10 but to
the best of our knowledge, no study has examined
how signaler credibility may differentially impact
stakeholders’ reactions to a signal, whether stake-
holders may alter their relative reliance on signals,
and how rehabilitative efforts can reverse this pro-
cess. In examining stockholders’ earnings and book
value, we demonstrate that stakeholders may not
categorically reduce their reliance on both signals,
despite the fact that they have both been compro-
mised. Rather, we show that stakeholders adopt
a rather sophisticated approach to discern the finer
differences between the two signals. In this way,
stakeholders seem to utilize rather wisely any in-
formation they can extract from a given signal.
Specifically, while stakeholders more markedly
revise their evaluative processes of firms following
a more severe (i.e., downward) restatement, they are
also more likely to revise their calculus after the
subsequent rehabilitative efforts. After an upward
restatement, however, stakeholders react in a more
reserved manner and do not seem to react as strongly
to the subsequent rehabilitative efforts. This suggests
that it is not only the characteristics of a particular
signal (e.g., the importanceof earningsandbookvalue
per se) that affect the signal’s interpretation, but also
the firm’s history. A less obvious insight is thus how
the relative reliance on a given signal can be surpris-
ingly impermanent, actually reverses multiple times,
and can be dependent on historical reasons.
Relatedly, we also discussed several different
reasons why a particular signal may be more or
less resistant to errors and manipulations, including
whether it was self- or other-reported, whether it was
verifiable, andwhether it was a flow or a stock signal.
We focusedon thedistinction between flowand stock
signals in our empirical examination by looking at
earnings (i.e., flow signal) and book value (i.e., stock
signal) and demonstrated that, when a firm violates
stakeholder expectations (for example, by engaging in
an earnings restatement), investors will shift their
relative reliance toward the stock signal, which tends
to be more resistant to errors and manipulations.
However, rehabilitative efforts could reverse this and
return the relative reliance closer to what it was prior
to the violation, thereby suggesting that the shift in
reliance was primarily due to the credibility of the
signaler and how that differentially affected the noise
associated with flow versus stock signals.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Although we believe that our study makes some
important contributions, it is not without limitations.
One limitation is thatweonlyexamined theseeffects in
the context of one type of violation of expectations—a
financial restatement. Although violation of expecta-
tions in the financial context can cause serious conse-
quences all over the world, we cannot be certain that
some of the changes in the way stakeholders rely on
different signalswill be similar across contexts. As this
study is one of the first to document the observation
that stakeholders change their process for evaluating
firms—and not just the evaluations themselves—in
response to events, we encourage future research to
examine other types of violation of expectations in
order to expand our understanding of this phenome-
non. Second, we only examined one particular type
10 Zhang and Wiersema (2009), for example, discussed
how Securities and Exchange Commission requirements
made CEO certifications of financial statements noisier
and less indicative of the quality of their financial perfor-
mance, because now everyone was required to issue them
above a certain level of revenue.
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of stakeholder—investors. We also looked at in-
vestors as a whole, but not at the reactions of indi-
vidual investors or different investor categories.
Whilewe believe itwas appropriate to first look at the
aggregate reactions of the investors, future studies
may wish to examine the reactions of other types of
stakeholders or those of individual stakeholders.
Third, the signalsweexamined—earnings andbook
value—are differentially susceptible to errors and
manipulations because one is a flow signal and the
other a stock signal. However, there could be a variety
of other reasons why a signal may be more or less
susceptible toerrorsandmanipulations.Wediscussed
self-versusother-reportingandverifiabilityof a signal,
which do not differ as far as earnings and book value
are concerned, but there could also be other reasons,
such as the stability of the measurement or reporting
rules and whether other signals indicate the same
characteristic. For example, signals that are reported
or measured in a consistent manner over time are less
manipulable or falsifiable since they can easily be
compared over time to determine whether they are
within a consistent and plausible range or whether
they seem less credible. On the other hand, if the exact
rules or criteria change (e.g., shift from the Research
Assessment Exercise in 2008 to the Research Excel-
lence Framework in 2014 to measure research pro-
ductivity in UK universities), then it becomes more
difficult to make a direct comparison, since the same
thing is not being measured over time, and hence the
signal becomes potentially more susceptible to ma-
nipulation or falsification. Similarly, if multiple sig-
nals indicate the same characteristic (e.g., a reflective
measure), then those signals tend to be less manipu-
lable or falsifiable since they can be cross-checked
with one another for consistency. Future researchers
could consider whether some of these different ways
in which signals could become less manipulable are
more salient to stakeholders than others, and whether
they might lead to subtly different reactions.
Finally, although the finance and accounting lit-
erature has suggested that both earnings and book
value provide slightly different information about
the future performance of the firm, there may be sit-
uations in which the signals of interest provide
largely overlapping and redundant information. In
such a case, rather thanmerely shifting their relative
reliance on the signals,wemight expect stakeholders
to switch completely towhichever signal had the lower
totalnoise,asopposedtocontinuing toutilizeboth; if so,
they may be less willing to switch back even following
rehabilitative efforts. While these are mere conjectures,
we encourage future researchers to explore them.
Overall, this study reveals the sophistication with
which stakeholders can change their reliance on
different signals, and their willingness to reverse
their earlier judgments to utilize any information
they can extract from a given signal.
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